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INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF DISTRIBUTIONS OF
STOCK RIGHTS TO SHAREHOLDERS
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SINCE 1937, courts have developed principles of income taxation peculiar
to stock rights distributed by corporations to their shareholders.' Resting on
several basic assumptions about the inherent nature of such rights, these prin-
ciples have produced illogical reasoning and uncertain standards in cases con-
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1. Not within the scope of this Article, except by way of analogy, are the tax prob-
lems of employee stock options and the subscription rights given or sold by the corpora-
tion to parties other than shareholders. The type of stock rights under consideration
are those which corporations frequently issue to their shareholders affording them the
privilege of subscribing to additional stock in the corporation. These subscription rights
or privileges are in widespread use; they are variously described as stock rights, stock
warrants, stock subscription rights, stock purchase rights or warrants, or stock options.
Although the terms "warrants" and "rights" are frequently used interchangeably, different
definitions have been advanced to reflect differences of usage in financial circles. "Right"
usually denotes the relatively short term privilege issued to stockholders to participate in
the purchase of an additional issue of the same class of securities or other securities at a
stated price. "Warrant" is used more often as a broader term to describe the privilege
frequently issued as an adjunct to another principal security in connection with the original
capitalization, or on reorganization; the holder has a long term-sometimes unlimited-
call upon the corporation. See DEWING, A STUDY OF CORPORATION SECURITIES 414-415
(1934); SHULTz, THE SECURITIES MARKET 47 (1946); 2 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY
OF CORPORATIONS 1140-1171 (5th ed. 1953) ; DODD & GRAHAM, SECURITY ANALYSIS 569-74
(3d ed. 1951) (option warrants of various types) ; Berle, Convertible Bonds and Stock
Purchase Warrants, 36 YALE L.J. 649 (1927) ; Garner & Forsythe, Stock Purchase War-
rants and "Rights," 4 So. CALIF. L. Rxv. 269, 275 (1931). It does riot matter for purposes
of our discussion whether subscription privileges are called stock warrants or stock rights.
A less common type of stock right accords to corporate shareholders the privilege of
subscribing to stock of another corporation owned by the issuing corporation. Although
the emphasis in this Article will be primarily upon the more prevalent stock right to
subscribe to the issuing corporation's own stock, the leading Supreme Court case in the
field involved subscription rights in stock of another corporation. That case has subse-
quently been accepted as determinative of the income tax law governing stock rights of
both types. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
The term "stock option" is frequently used interchangeably with "stock right," see,
e.g., Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942), but there is a tendency to
use the word "option" more broadly to describe employee stock options and the privilege
in the hands of third parties to purchase stock or other property. See, e.g., MONTaOIsEY,
FEDERAL TAXES § 11.3 (35th ed. 1954) : "Stock rights are rights normally inherent in stock
ownership. Stock options acquired without relation to stock ownership are not stock
rights." See note 38 infra for the tax treatment of such options. See also E. T. Weir,
10 T.C. 996, 999 (1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1949), pointing out this "fundamental
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cerning the taxability and valuation of stock rights as income. This article will
examine the principles and their administrative interpretations and will attempt
a fresh approach 2 under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and subchapter C
regulations on corporate distributions.
As with other corporate distributions to shareholders, the issuance of stock
rights is ordinarily preceded by a declaration authorizing the rights to be issued
to each shareholder in proportion to his stock on a certain date (usually called
the record date). Certificates representing the rights are later issued to the
shareholders in the authorized proportion. The holder may then purchase at
subscription price a limited number of shares of the specified stock. Issued
to raise additional capital, the rights give the shareholders an opportunity to
subscribe before outsiders at a price below the current market of the stock,
thus insuring success for the subscription.2 Rights may normally be exercised
by payment of the subscription price after their declaration or issuance and
distinction" between a stock right and an option and holding that the statutory provisions
treating the holding periods of stock rights, see text at note 75 infra, applied only to
rights, not to options.
For typical forms for stock rights, warrants and fractional warrants, see 2 FLETCHER,
CORPORATION FORMS ANN OATED §§ 1733-41 (3d ed. 1938).
Certain stock rights issued pursuant to orders of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission are not discussed herein, since they are expressly exempted from taxation and
present no special problems. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1081(c), 1083(f). For non-
taxable rights of this type there is a requirement of apportionment of the cost basis of
the original stock between the rights and the stock in proportion to the fair market
values of each. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1082(c) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.372-2(c)
(1953). A loss would be sustained upon lapse by failure to exercise. Spec. Rul., 4 CCH
1947 STAND. FED. TAX SERV. fr 6113; 1 CCH 1957 STAND. FED. TAX REP. If 658.265.
Rights to subscribe to bonds as well as stock are sometimes issued. These have been
treated as dividends in property and taxable upon receipt. G.C.M. 13414, XIII-2 Cum.
BULL 124 (1934); Spec. Rul., 3 CCH 1941 STAND. FED. TAX. SERr. ff 6141. Such rights,
however, have been ruled non-taxable by the Treasury when the bonds to which they
related were convertible into stock of the same kind held by the shareholder and which
therefore would be a non-taxable stock dividend. Spec. Rul., 3 CCH 1941 STAND. FED.
TAX SERv. f" 6480. Accord, Van Nostrand v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1937); Elvira Scatena, 32"B.T.A. 675 (1935); T. I. Hare Powel, 27 B.T.A. 55 (1932).
Scrip, fractional rights or warrants representing the right of the holder relating to
less than a full share also present problems. See FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS
§ 8977 (rev. & perm. ed. 1933) ; I.T. 2392, VI-2 Cum. BU.L 17 (1927) (allocation of basis
between original stock and scrip).
2. See Bittker, Stock Dizidends, Distributions in Kind, Redemptions and Liqui-
dations Under the 1954 Code, 1955 U. So. CALIF. TAx INsT. 349, 357.
3. For discussion of whether the shareholders have preemptive rights inherent in their
stock ownership and other policy factors governing issuance of rights, see, generally,
2 DEwINi;, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1140-41 (5th ed., 1953); DEwING, A
STUDY IN CORPORATION SEcuIrrIEs 112 (1934) ; FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS
§ 8975 (rev. & perm. ed. 1933); Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J.
563 (1929) ; Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, 42 HARV. L. REv. 186
(1928). Typically underwriters guarantee purchase of the non-subscribed portion of the
stock issue. On revocability of subscription rights after declaration, see Comment, 39 YALE
L.J. 1163 (1930).
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before a date set for expiration.4 Use of subscription rights to raise new capital
is widespread, despite occasional criticism of the soundness or necessity of
this means of financing. 5
Determination of the event which produces taxable income from stock
rights is made difficult by the courts' misconception of the economic nature of
the interest created upon issuance of rights to shareholders. Since this judicial
misconception antedates the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and is not ex-
pressly resolved by it, the pre-1954 cases as well as the pertinent language of
the 1954 Code will be considered.
THE LAW PRIOR TO THE 1954 CODE
The Taxable Event
The judicial development of principles peculiar to taxation of stock rights
is best understood by a detailed review of three cases treating the consequences
of issuance, exercise and sale of stock rights. These principles were developed
quite independently from questions of taxability of stock dividends, for the
stock rights cases all involved situations where a distribution of the stock
itself would clearly have been taxable as income.
7
In 1937, the Supreme Court in Palmer v. Commissioner s held that no
taxable income was realized by a shareholder upon the exercise of stock rights.
4. This date may vary widely, and there may also be other conditions or restrictions
upon exercise.
5. Corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange raised two billion dollars
during 1956 through the offering of subscription rights to holders of common stock. The
Exchange, April 1957, p. 9.
See 2 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1160, 1163 (5th ed. 1953), which
points out the dilution of stockholders' equity through the practice.
6. The difficulties surrounding the taxability of stock dividends caused much litiga-
tion prior to the 1954 Code and have been widely discussed. See, e.g., Lowndes, The
Taxation of Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 147 (1947) ; Rott-
schaefer, Present Taxable Status of Stock Dividends in Federal Law, 28 MINN. L. REv.
106 (1944).
To the extent that the difficulties have been eliminated in the 1954 Code by congres-
sional renunciation of intention to tax, see Bittker, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937). When the stock itself
was not taxable attempts to tax stock rights failed. See Charles M. Cooke, Ltd., 2 T.C. 147
(1943) (since preferred stock issued to common stockholders was non-taxable, the
rights could not be taxed either upon receipt or exercise) ; Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 259 U.S. 247 (1921) (dictum). Consequently, stock rights issued prior to June 22,
1954, the effective date of the 1954 corporate distributions provisions, INT. REV. CoDE OF
1954, § 391, created the same uncertainties as stock dividends. The line of demarcation
between taxable and non-taxable rights is determined by the taxability as a dividend of the
stock offered in the right, subject to the added hurdle for stock rights of principles announced
in Palmer v. Commissioner, supra. See also MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 59-62 (rev. ed. 1945).
8. 302 U.S. 63 (1.937), 51 HARV. L. REv. 515 (1938), 86 U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1938).
When Palmer reached the Supreme Court, the taxability of stock rights issued to share-
holders to buy stock in another corporation had caused a conflict in the circuits. Holding
taxable upon receipt by shareholder: Ramapo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 986 (2d Cir.
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The corporation had distributed to its shareholders pro rata a series of fifteen-
day rights to subscribe to shares of stock which it owned in another corporation.
Despite a showing in the record that the underlying stock was selling at about
twice the subscription price when the rights were delivered and that the rights
themselves had established market values on a stock exchange, the Supreme
Court sustained the Tax Court's finding of fact that the corporation intended
only a sale of stock to shareholders at fair value. The "transaction-in form
a sale-was not intended to be the means of a distribution of earnings to share-
holders" and could not be converted into a taxable dividend by the fact that
the value of the shares was higher than the subscription price.10 Therefore,
the Court reasoned, the exercise of the rights was an acceptance of the cor-
poration's offer to sell which did not give rise to taxable income.
The Court, by way of dictum, further said that the "mere issue of rights to
subscribe and their receipt by stockholders" could be neither a "dividend""
nor a "distribution of corporate assets or diminution of the net worth of the
corporation,"
"[since the rights] are at most options or continuing offers, potential
sources of income to the stockholders through sale or the exercise of the
rights. Taxable income might result through their sale, but distribution
of the corporate property could take place only on their exercise.'
12
But even the exercise of the rights was not a distribution in this case, for the
corporation was committed to the sale "by appropriate corporate action" when
the sale price represented the reasonable value of the shares.
1936) (rights constituted taxable dividend to extent of their value when made available to
the shareholder, since the corporation had undistributed earnings and profits sufficient to
cover the distribution), 31 ILL. L. REv. 537; Commissioner v. Mayer, 86 F.2d 593 (7th
Cir. 1936), rcev'd (on authority of Palmer), 302 U.S. 647 (1937). Holding not taxable
either on receipt or exercise: Helvering v. Bartlett, 71 F.2d 598 (4th Cir. 1934) (issuance
of the option was not a distribution within statutory definition of a dividend, and acceptance
of the option by exercise merely merged the continuing offer of the option into the contract
of purchase resulting from acceptance), 41 W. VA. L.Q. 93 (1934) ; see also Commissioner
v. Cummings, 77 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1935).
An earlier Supreme Court case, Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company, 259 U.S.
247 (1921), involved rights issued pro rata to shareholders to subscribe to a new issue
of the corporation's own common stock. The rights were not taxable because distribu-
tion of the stock itself fell within the concept of a non-taxable stock dividend under the
law prevailing at that time. Nevertheless the Court considered the rights a mere privilege
or equity to the shareholders to participate in contributing new capital to the corporation,
not a distribution to them of profits. Id. at 252.
9. 302 U.S. at 70.
10. But the Court admitted that such a sale at a bargain may sometimes amount to a
distribution of profits to shareholders, to the extent of the difference between the value
of the shares purchased and their subscription price. 302 U.S. at 69.
11. 302 U.S. at 70. The word "dividend" was then defined by the Revenue Act of
1936, § 115(f), 49 STAT. 1688. Minnie T. Grippin, 36 B.T.A. 1109 (1937) (rights to buy
shares of stock in another corporation, with no value at time of issuance) is in accord
with the Palmer dictum as to non-taxability of stock rights upon issuance.
12. 302 U.S. at 70.
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In Choate v. Commissioner' 3 the Second Circuit applied Palmer principles
to the exercise by shareholders of rights to subscribe to the issuing corpora-
tion's own stock 14 and followed the Palmer dictum that income could never
be realized by receipt of rights alone. The rights had substantial market value
when received by the taxpayer, but were worth much less when exercised
near their expiration date. The event giving rise to income taxable to the share-
holder was held to be the exercise of the rights and the tax was measured by
their value at that time. The reasoning was that the distribution of earnings
by the corporation to its shareholders took place at the time of exercise of the
rights.15 Here, unlike Palmer, the court found an original intention to distribute
corporate earnings to shareholders and not merely to offer them an opportunity
to buy stock from the corporation. Judge Frank, writing for the court, inter-
preted the Palmer requirement of corporate intention to make a distribution of
earnings to mean an "objective" intention which he found in the issuance of
rights having real value.16
The opinion also suggested the tax result when the value of rights changed
between the time of receipt and exercise. If the rights appreciated between
issuance and exercise, the taxable amount would be limited to their value when
issued; if they declined, only their value when exercised could be taxed, for
13. 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942).
14. The court expressly adopted the principle that shareholders could realize no income
from receipt of subscription rights, but only potential dividends. 129 F.2d at 687. Whether
the rights related to the subscription of stock in the issuing corporation or in another
corporation was considered immaterial since the stock to which the rights related qualified
constitutionally as a taxable stock dividend, and there were ample earnings and profits
in the corporation's hands to cover the shareholder's ratable portion of the distribution.
This situation is assumed throughout this discussion.
On the difference between stock in the issuing and another corporation, see an earlier
case in the same circuit, Metcalf's Estate v. Commissioner, 32 F.2d 192, 194 (2d Cir.
1929), holding that a distribution of the assets of a corporation in cash or in stock of a
different enterprise is a dividend (unlike a stock dividend in the issuing corporation,
which was exempted from taxation at that time). See Moran v. Lucas, 36 F.2d 546
(D.C. Cir. 1929), 43 HAgv. L. Rav. 1157 (1930.); B. F. Saul, 4 B.T.A. 639 (1926). This
distinction between stock rights in the issuing corporation's stock and another corporation's
stock seems sound. See Brief for Appellee, p. 17, Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63
(1937). But the difficulty created by the Palmer conception of the nature of stock rights
seems to prevent proper evaluation of the tax effect of issuance of rights of both types.
If income is realized by the issuance of subscription rights in the issuing corporation's
stock, the same result would necessarily follow with regard to stock rights in another
corporation's stock.
15. 129 F.2d at 687. The court viewed the exercise of the favorable option (i.e. rights)
as an acceptance by the stockholder of "the corporate offer, embodied in the option, inten-
tionally to distribute corporate earnings." The rights were actually exercised by members
of the stockholder's family to whom he gave them, but the stockholder himself was taxed
under the principle of Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
16. 129 F.2d at 686. This value, according to both the Choate and Palmer opinions,
consists in and is measured by the so-called spread, the difference between the fair market
value of the stock and the subscription price at the time the valuation is made. See text
at note 45 infra.
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that would be the limit of the actual distribution. The result is curious: al-
though distribution by the corporation may not take place before a share-
holder's exercise of rights, both taxability and taxable value are determined by
facts existing at the time the corporation issues the rights.
1 7
Both Choate and Palmer held that stock rights were taxable only as divi-
dends, if at all. The contention that stock rights should be taxable under
the broad provision of section 22(a) without regard to the statutory definition
of "dividends" was rejected in the Choate case on the ground that distributions
of rights were referred to only in the statutory provisions affecting dividend
distributions.' 8 And on the authority of the Palmer and Choate cases, together
with Helvering v. Horst,19 the court had no trouble in finding that dividend
income was realized upon sale of rights in Gibson v. Commissioner.20 The
rights to subscribe to stock in the issuing corporation had substantial value
when received by the shareholders, and the sale price was slightly higher still.
The court held the sale of rights a realization of income by analogy to Helvering
v. Horst, even though upon receipt the taxpayer had only "an option to obtain
a distribution by exercise." Although the sale of stock rights by a shareholder,
like the exercise, would seem to constitute a realization of income to him, it
is difficult to view the sale by the shareholders as a distribution by the corpora-
tion. Nevertheless, that portion of the sale price representing the market value
of the rights when received was treated as ordinary income. Since neither
the taxpayer nor the Commissioner had challenged the inclusion of the balance
of the sale price as capital gain, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether
this balance could have been taxed as ordinary income.
The Treasury Department, however, has since taken the position that the
entire amount received upon the sale, not merely the value of the right when
received, is taxable as ordinary income. 21 This position appears irreconcilable
with Treasury approval, in the same ruling, of the Choate principle that only
17. That the absence of a spread at time of exercise, despite spread at issuance,
would have precluded any tax under Choate, see Lowndes, supra note 6, at 165.
18. 129 F.2d at 689. The dividend provisions may be found in Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§§ 115(a), 115(f)(1-2), 53 STAT. 46-47.
19. 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (owner of bonds taxed on interest as income, although he
had given away coupons shortly before they matured).
20. 133 F.2d 308, 309 (2d Cir. 1943), appeal dismissed, 320 U.S. 805 (1944). The
shareholder was not allowed to escape realization of the income by selling the rights
instead of exercising them. See also Commissioner v. Cummings, 77 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.
1935). Cf. Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942) (gain upon exercise
taxed to shareholder who had given rights to members of his family who later exercised
them). The court in Choate also rejected the argument that gain upon the sale of a right
instead of its exercise might be taxable under the broad language purporting to tax all
income "from whatever source derived," without reference to the dividend provision
contemplating a distribution of corporate earnings. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(a), 52
STAT. 457 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61 (a)).
21. G.C.M. 25063, 1947-1 Cum. BULL. 45 (1947). See also Spec. Rulings, 4 CCH
1947 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 6099 (1946), 4 CCH 1947 STAND. FED. TAX REP. f[ 6098
(1946).
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the value when issued is taxable to the shareholder who exercises appreciated
rights. If the increase in value of rights between issuance and exercise is not
considered part of the intended dividend, it cannot reasonably be argued that a
similar increase prior to sale should be treated differently. The ruling does
clearly acquiesce in the principle of the Palmer and Choate decisions that income
is realized only upon exercise or sale of stock rights, not by mere receipt,
-2 2
and in the additional principle of the Choate decision that valuation should be
determined at receipt or at exercise, whichever is lower.
At least six dates on which stock rights may be said to result in income to
the shareholder appear possible.23 These are: (1) the date of declaration of
rights by the corporation; (2) the date of record, when the shareholders en-
titled to receive rights are determined by reference to the corporation's books;
(3) the date when rights first become available to shareholders ;24 (4) the earliest
date on which the rights can be exercised ;25 (5) the actual date of exercise
or sale; and (6) the date when stock purchased through exercise of rights
is finally sold.26 In holding that income can never be realized by the share-
holder upon the mere issuance of rights, Pahner rejected the first three of these
possible dates and permitted taxation at exercise or sale, subject to certain
conditions. When the corporation has no intention of making a distribution
at the time of issuance, a necessary factual conclusion when the rights have no
initial value, the Palmer doctrine prevents taxation of the rights as income even
upon exercise or sale. Thus only the sixth date-that of sale of the stock acquired
22. Since courts conceived that the nature of stock rights prevented taxation in the
absence of exercise or sale, it followed that lapse or expiration of rights produced no tax
consequence of any kind. See text at note 64 infra.
23. See 47 YALE L.J. 139 (1937).
24. Several commentators take the position that a tax to the shareholders upon receipt
of stock rights at their fair value at that time is both constitutional and desirable. See
Lowndes, supra note 6, at 157-70; Notes, 47 YALE L.J. 139, 142 (1937) ; 51 HAgv. L. REv.
515, 519-20 (1938) ; 31 ILL L. Rmv. 537, 540 (1936). See also Lincoln, Stock Dividends
and Stock Rights, 27 TAxEs 109, 111 (1949). But cf. Note, 51 CoLum. L. REv. 496, 507
(1951).
"Time of issuance" and "time of issue" have sometimes been used synonymously by
courts and writers alike, apparently to denote the date of distribtition. The term "date of
issue" carries a possible ambiguity for it could also mean the time of the corporate action
authorizing the rights. "Time of issuance" should mean the time when the corporation
makes the distribution. See U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1 (b) (1955) for an example in which
the date of distribution by the corporation was in a different taxable year from the date
of receipt by the shareholder. Since the tax is upon the shareholder, the time for inclusion
in income is the date of actual receipt, or availability to him, of the dividend, Avery v.
Commissioner, 292 U.S. 210 (1934), although valuation is determined as of the date of
distribution. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 301(b). The word "receipt" will be used herein
wherever possible.
25. The Supreme Court in Palmer recognized this as a possible alternative, although
in fact the rights were exercisable as soon as they were received. 302 U.S. at 68. See also
Brief for Appellee, pp. 31, 40, Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937).
26. A possible variation might recognize the rights as income at issuance to the extent
of their existing value, any increased value upon exercise or sale becoming additional
income at the latter time.
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through exercise of the rights-is left for possible realization of income in the
form of capital gain.
2 7
What are the merits in the judicially developed principles that taxable income
is never realized by the mere issuance of stock rights to the shareholder, and
that taxable income may be realized by the shareholder's subsequent exercise
or sale of the rights only if there is corporate intention to make a distribution
at the time of issuance? Financial literature and practice attach monetary value
to stock rights as soon as they are declared for the benefit of those listed as
shareholders on the record date.28  The rights may usually be sold or traded
on an exchange, but, prior to the issuance of certificates, a shareholder may
sell rights only on a "when, as, and if issued" basis, subject to certain restric-
tions.29 Since the rights are not fully transferable before the certificates are
printed, issued and delivered to the shareholder, practical difficulties prevent
their valuation for tax purposes upon either the declaration or record date.
Frequently, corporations expressly reserve the power to withdraw or change
their plans to issue rights prior to actual issuance. Even if this power is not
so reserved, the possibility remains that rights will be held revocable prior to
issuance.3 0
Upon receipt of the certificates, however, the shareholder has rights with
ascertainable value which may be transferred without restriction. The rights
have value independently of the underlying stock, which shortly before the
record date is usually selling separately from the rights on the exchanges.
Taxing the rights to the extent of their fair market value upon delivery to the
shareholder would be consonant with the general principle of tax accounting
which taxes dividends upon receipt.3 ' And most commentators have taken the
position that actual receipt is the most logical time for imposition of the tax.
3 2
27. A capital gain might be realized upon sale by the shareholder or by a transferee
with a substituted basis. See, e.g., INT. Rv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1015. Whether the gain or
loss thus realized is long or short term depends upon the holding period computed from
the date the stock was acquired by exercise of rights. Id. § 1223(6), discussed in text at
note 77 infra. Of course, if the transferee had acquired the stock from the original stock-
holder with a new basis-e.g., acquisition after his death-the basis would be the fair
market value at death (id. § 1014), and the holding period would likewise begin with
the date of such acquisition.
28. 2 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1157-62 (5th ed. 1953).
29. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 550(d) (3) and explanation, P.E.-351;
47 YALE L.J. 139, 140 (1937).
30. See Comment, 39 YA.E L.J. 1163 (1930). There are no cases directly in point.
To the effect that a stock dividend is revocable, Staats v. Biograph Co., 236 Fed. 454 (2d
Cir. 1916) ; Terry v. Eagle Lock CO., 47 Conn. 141 (1879) ; STENS, CORPORATIONS 460
(2d ed. 1949).
31. Avery v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 210, 215 (1934) (dividend checks not "unquali-
fiedly subject to the petitioner's demand" until received on January 2, in the calendar
year following the year of mailing on December 31). But a taxpayer would not be allowed
to defer his dividend income until his next taxable year by requesting the corporation to
delay sending his dividend check. A doctrine of constructive receipt is applied. Frank W.
Kunze, 19 T.C. 29 (1952).
32. See note 24 supra. Taxation of rights as ordinary income upon receipt, it has
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The holding in Palmer v. Commissioner that no income was realized upon
issuance to the shareholder might be justified as an acceptance of the Board's
finding of fact that the rights had no value when issued. 33 But the dictum, since
accepted as law, that income is never realized upon issuance by reason of the
nature of stock rights ig-nores the fact that the rights themselves have a readily
ascertainable market value.3 4 The Court adopted two related premises about
issuance of stock rights: (1) issuance constitutes merely a continuing offer of
sale by the corporation to the shareholders; and (2) no diminution of corporate
assets results from issuance. The first statement overlooks the economic
reality that rights are transferable and have market value. The second seems no
more than an afterthought induced by the Court's view that rights constitute
only an offer of sale. In reality, when a corporation distributes rights to sub-
scribe to stock in another corporation, the corporate assets are reduced at
distribution to the degree that there is a spread at that time between market
and subscription price.35 Although the corporation sacrifices its own interest
in any future increment in the stock's value above subscription price, the real
diminution, if any, takes place at the time of distribution when actual rather
than speculative assets are reduced. And when the corporation distributes
rights to subscribe to its own stock, which is not carried as an asset, no diminu-
tion or write-down of the corporate assets can ever occur.36 Moreover,
diminution of corporate assets is, in all cases, irrelevant to whether or not
the rights represent income to the shareholder.
Again, the cases have developed the questionable principle that even the ex-
ercise of rights is not a taxable event unless there is a corporate intention to
make a distribution of earnings. The courts' tendency to view the transaction
primarily as a sale to the shareholders may lie behind this notion, for Palner
indicated that it might be the government's responsibility to show corporate
intention when the transaction is "on its face a sale."'37 But the tax is imposed
upon the shareholder and is based upon his realization of income from invest-
ment in the corporate enterprise. The intention of the corporation appears
irrelevant even where undistributed corporate earnings and profits are suffi-
cient to cover the shareholder's ratable portion of the distribution. Moreover,
the corporate intention requirement places a premium on window dressing
which clothes the transaction in the form of an offer of sale by the corporation
to the shareholders.
been suggested, eliminates the possibility of loss of revenue through expiration of rights
without exercise. See 47 YALE L.J. 139, 142 (1937).
33. 302 U.S. at 68. See Lowndes, supra note 6, at 159-60.
34. See 2 DEWING, FINANcIAL PoLicy OF COR'ORATIONS 1160-61 (5th ed., 1953)
(describing the realization of money by sale of the rights, or, sometimes, by short sale
of stock).
35. 47 YALE L.J. 139, 142 (1937).
36. Bittker, supra note 2, at 357. Where there is a distribution of rights to subscribe
to stock in the issuing corporation, in actual accounting practice a charge against surplus
rather than a write-down of assets would probably be made. Note, 51 COLUMI. L. REV.
496, 498 (1951).
37. 302 U.S. at 69.
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But if corporate intent is relevant, its meaning in this context is still in-
definite. The corporation usually has two purposes in distributing rights to
subscribe to stock. The first is admittedly to raise new capital; but the desire
to benefit the shareholders indirectly by enabling them to subscribe to new
stock at an advantageous price is often an additional factor. The exercise of stock
rights obviously involves a sale in that the shareholder receives new shares
for the subscription price. Frequently the subscription price is almost as high
as the market value of the stock, and the shareholders' benefit is relatively
small; in this context a simple purchase and sale approach might be justified.
But the differential between market value of new shares purchased and subscrip-
tion price is the measure of a bargain, in the sense of economic benefit. Further-
more, if the shareholder chooses not to subscribe, he may sell the rights them-
selves. This independent value of rights on the exchange exposes the fallacy
of a simple purchase and sale approach.
Employee stock option cases provide an analogy.3 8 At one time courts
refused to find a taxable event in the exercise by an employee of a favorable
stock option, unless the option was intended as compensation. If the option was
interpreted merely as an opportunity to purchase a proprietary interest in
the corporation, no tax was assessed. 39 But recent Supreme Court pronounce-
ments have reduced the emphasis upon the purchase aspect of the exercise
of rights and view the compensatory element of the bargain purchase real-
istically as income.40 In Commissioner v. LoBue 41 an express corporate intent
to confer a proprietary interest did not deter the court from finding the option
taxable as compensation. Judicial disregard of corporate intent in this context
suggests similar de-emphasis of the sale element in the purchase of stock
through the exercise of rights.
38. The type of stock options under discussion are those not qualifying as "restricted
stock options" under INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421. The general principles of income
under § 61(a) (1) are applicable to the non-qualifying type. For complete discussion of
both types of options, see Rudick, Executives' Compensation, Including Stock Option
Arrangements Under the 1954 Code, 1955 U. So. CALI. TAX INsT. 655. See also Lyon,
Employee Stock Purchase Arrangements, 31 TAXES 1021 (1953) ; Lyon, Employee Stock
Options Under the Revente Act of 1950, 51 Com.im L. REV. 1 (1951). Compare § 305(c)
with § 61 (a) (1) in the 1954 Code for distributions which may have the effect of compen-
sation.
39. See, e.g., Abraham Rosenberg, 20 T.C. 5 (1953); Norman G. Nicolson, 13 T.C.
690 (1949); cases collected in Rudick, supra note 38, at 700-24. Rudick concludes that
many factors bear upon whether the option is "compensatory" or "proprietary," no single
factor being conclusive. Transferability is a normal feature of rights distributed to share-
holders not usually present in employee stock options. For valuation difficulties when
options are non-transferable or subject to restrictions, see note -42 infra.
On the similarity between stock option and stock rights cases, compare the language
"sales of ... assets to stockholders at fair value," Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63,
71 (1937), with intention to confer a "proprietary interest," Commissioner v. LoBue, 351
U.S. 243, 245 (1956).
40. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S.
177 (1945). Both cases referred to Palmer with apparent approval.
41. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
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The employee cases also by analogy support the view that stock rights may
constitute income upon receipt even without exercise. In the LoBue case the
taxable event was deferred until the employee exercised his option, because
the particular options under consideration were not transferable by the em-
ployee and were restricted in other respects. But the court recognized the
possibility that a valuable option may be compensation at the time of receipt:
"It is of course possible for the recipient of a stock option to realize an
immediate taxable gain. See Commissioner v. Smith . . . .The option
might have a readily ascertainable market value and the recipient might
be free to sell his option."42
Two Justices viewed "the taxable event as the grant of each option, not its
exercise," and another recent case recognizes the receipt by the employee of the
option as the taxable event.
43
Admittedly, taxability of employee stock options depends upon the finding
of compensation under the broad statutory definition of income,44 whereas
taxability of distributions to shareholders is dependent upon the finding of
a dividend under the corporate distribution provisions. Yet there is no reason
for conflicting views about the occurrence of the taxable event.
Valuation
Whether receipt or exercise of stock rights constitutes the taxable event is
a determining factor in the problem of time and manner of valuation. Unless
the difficulties in determining the value of stock rights at issuance is a valid
policy rationale in favor of deferring the taxable event until exercise, con-
siderations of fairness militate against such postponement. Courts and writers
have usually assumed that the value of rights is determined by the spread,
or excess of the fair market value of the stock over the subscription price,
determined as of the time the valuation is made.45 Use of the spread, how-
ever, amounts only to a determination of the bargain element in the share-
42. 351 U.S. at 248. Non-transferability and restrictions upon employee options
may give rise to valuation difficulties not present in the shareholder cases. See Note, 62
YALE L.J. 832 (1953); Comment, 21. U. CH. L. Rav. 464 (1954).
43. 351 U.S. at 250 (concurring and dissenting opinion). See Commissioner v. Stone's
Estate, 19 T.C. 872 (1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954), 64 YALE L.J. 269 (1954).
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a). See cases collected in Rudick, supra note 38,
at 700-24.
45. Choate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1942) speaks only of the spread in
discussing the value of rights, whether determined at the time of issuance or exercise.
See W. G. Maguire, 20 T.C. 20 (1953) ; Lowndes, .supra note 6, at 159, 163. But cf. Note,
51 COLU . L. REV. 496, 507 (1951) (effective method of taxing at issuance must be "upon
valuation, rather than spread").
If the subscription price should be greater than the market price of the stock there
would be a negative spread, so that the value of the rights would be zero on the assumption
that value is measured by spread. It is conceivable that the rights might have value even in this
situation. See Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 19 T.C. 872 (1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 33
(3d Cir. 1954).
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holder's investment when he buys the stock. But the market value of the
stock rights themselves is the real object of valuation. Although the spread
will usually approximate the market value of the rights, many additional
factors may be overlooked by application of the spread test alone. Among
these are prospects for expansion and growth in the particular corporation and
in the industry, the fluctuating or stable nature of the price range of the stock,
the length of time permitted for the exercise of rights 46 and of course the
trend of the economy generally. Although traditional formulas for determin-
ing the value of a stock right before exercise are based upon the market value
of stock and the subscription price, recently additional and more comprehensive
formulas have been suggested to take account of some other variables.
"7 Never-
theless, all recognize that the actual market value may differ from the theo-
retical value computed under the formulas. 48 Treasury regulations under the
1954 Code clearly consider the possibility that market value of rights is some-
times less than the spread. 49 It is even possible for rights to have value when
received by the shareholder although the stock is worth less than the sub-
scription price.r°
46. 2 DEwiNG, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1157-58 (5th ed. 1953) ; 47 YALE
L.J. 139 (1937).
47. 2 DEwING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1158 (5th ed. 1953).
Traditional formulas are set out in id. at 1208. BADGER, INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES AND
PRAcricEs 741 (1935); Livmorm, INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES AND ANALYSIS 33 (1938).
A more complete treatment of factors in the valuation of rights appears in Evans, The
Theoretical Value of a Stock Right, 10 J. FINANCE 53 (1955), where two formulas are
offered for estimating the value of rights more accurately than under traditional practice.
One is to be used when stock prices are assumed to be determined by earnings and the
sccond when dividends are assumed to be the determining factor. Although a combination
of formulas may be used in determining the theoretical value of a right to help the corpora-
tion decide upon the optimum subscription price, the actual value upon issuance must be
determined differently.
48. 2 DEwING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1158-59 (5th ed. 1953) points
out reasons for differences between market and theoretical values.
49. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.307-1(b) (1955), under the 1954 Code provision concerning
the allocation of the original basis of stock between the stock and the rights in proportion
to the fair market values of each at the time of distribution. An example is given in
which the fair market value of one right is $19, but the "spread" is $20 (the fair market
value of one share, ex-rights, being $110 and the subscription price $90).
50. In Commissioner v. Stone's Estate, 19 T.C. 872 (1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 33 (3d
Cir. 1954), Graham & Dodd stock purchase warrants were issued to the corporation's
president who paid $1000 for them. The warrants specified a subscription price greater
than the market value of the stock. The president nevertheless paid ordinary income tax
on $5000 ($6000 less the $1000 consideration paid) in that year, treating the warrants
as income in the form of compensation. In a later year he sold the warrants for $82,680,
claiming a capital gain for the excess of sales price over basis. The Third Circuit agreed
with the Tax Court that the rights were properly declared as income in the year received.
Thus it may sometimes work to the taxpayer's advantage to pay the tax upon the value
of rights or options when received. Opportunities for tax reduction, avoidance or evasion
are also suggested. Rights, especially those of a small corporation, might be issued and
taxes paid early in the history of the enterprise when the shares are depressed or un-
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Courts have readily determined the fair market value of rights at time of
exercise to be the value of the stock received minus the subscription price.
Although this solution may be an easy rule of thumb for practical purposes, it
does not make the rights themselves the subject of valuation for income tax
purposes, but rather their exercise, considered as the distribution in the form
of the bargain portion of the shareholder's subscription purchase. If the market
value of the rights immediately prior to exercise may be less than the market
value of the stock minus subscription price,51 the theory of taxation is neces-
sarily based upon the bargain element of the purchase rather than upon the
value of the rights, in so far as the spread exceeds the market value of the rights.
Clearly, the propriety and fairness to the taxpayer of this procedure is question-
able.
A more appropriate theory would tax the rights themselves, valued at the
time they are first made available to the shareholder. Valuation at the time of
distribution permits valuation data to be collected for a single time; choice of
exercise or sale requires valuation at many different times for different stock-
holders. There are no insurmountable difficulties in valuation, even though
rights are frequently issued as part of a series at different times and are
usually of short term duration.5 2 Unlike employee stock options, rights are
commonly issued by public corporations to large numbers of shareholders; they
usually have a ready market, and are quoted on the exchanges, and are not
subject to the same types of conditions and restrictions. In the absence of a
ready market, no greater valuation difficulty exists than that for other types
of property, where all relevant circumstances must be considered.
THE EFFECT OF THE 1954 CODE PROVISIONS
The Taxable Event
The 1954 Code contains no provisions specifically directed to a solution of
the problems raised by Palmer and Choate, and leading tax authorities have
continued to treat the pre-1954 decisions as determinative.53 Nevertheless,
marketable and the rights appear to have no value. Perhaps a tax upon exercise or upon
issuance with an additional tax upon the increase in value between issuance and exercise
or sale would partially solve this problem. But the final solution is only to be found in a
wholesale reform of capital gains principles.
51. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.307-1(b) (1955). See 2 DEVING, FINANCIAL Poucv OF
CORPORATIONS 1209 (5th ed. 1953).
52. The last factor may even simplify valuation since only records of market price
over the shorter periods need be maintained.
53. "It is important to note in this connection that the mere receipt of rights to pur-
chase corporate assets, even at a favorable price, does not result in income. There
is no income, in any event, unless the rights are exercised or sold or otherwise
disposed of." (emphasis added.)
2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 11.09 (rev. ed. 1955). Palmer is cited to sup-
port this proposition. See 1 P-H 1957 FED. TAX SERv. 111 9420, 9424B. Cf. earlier treat-
ment in MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 59-62 (rev. ed. 1945).
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subchapter C and the regulations do contain language relevant to these
problems.
The pre-1954 principles were applied with equal effect to rights permitting
subscription to stock in the issuing corporation and to stock in another corpora-
tion.54 In one significant respect the 1954 Code differentiates betveen the two
kinds of rights. A special exclusion now affects both stock and rights to acquire
stock in the issuing corporation. The general rule of section 305 (a), following
the pattern of stock dividends, excludes such stock rights from taxability' 53
Two exceptions in 305(b) are designed to tax distributions when they are in
effect "in lieu of money," that is, (1) to the extent that the stock or rights
distributed are in discharge of preference dividends for the taxable year or for
the preceding taxable year, or (2) when distribution is at the election of any
shareholder payable in other property instead. If either exception applies, the
distribution of stock rights "shall be treated as a distribution to which section
301 applies." 56 By excluding from taxable income most distributions of stock
rights in the issuing corporation's stock, the Code greatly narrows the area in
which problems of the taxable event and the time for tax valuation can arise.
But rights in the issuing corporation's stock taxable under section 305 (b) and
rights to subscribe to stock of another corporation preserve the old difficulties.
Stock rights to subscribe to stock in a corporation other than the issuing cor-
poration and rights to subscribe to stock of the issuing corporation excepted
by section 305 (b) are governed by section 301, the general provision dealing
with corporate distributions to shareholders when the specific provisions in sub-
chapter C do not apply. Section 301(b) defines the amount of distribution to
individuals as the "money received, plus the fair market value of the other
property received."57 It also provides that the fair market value shall be de-
termined "as of the date of the distribution." This clause justifies an inference
54. In the cases dealing with stock rights of both types, the stock itself would have
been taxable if distributed to the stockholders. A distribution of stock of another
corporation is taxable under well-established principles. See Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S.
347 (1918). To hold stock rights in the issuing corporation taxable, the same require-
ments for a constitutionally taxable stock dividend had to be satisfied, see Eisner v. Ma-
comber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Koshland v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 441 (1936), as for a
distribution of the stock itself. The cases discussing stock rights were cases in which
these requirements were met; there were also undistributed earnings and profits in the
corporation sufficient to cover the shareholder's ratable proportion of the distribution.
See note 14 supra.
55. IxNr. REv. COD OF 1954, § 305 (a). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 241
(1954). The purpose of the new provision was to eliminate such problems as whether
the proportionate interest of the shareholder in the corporation is altered, see Koshland
v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936), by ending the taxation of stock dividends and rights
to the shareholder in most cases. See 2 ALI FE). INcoME TAx STAT. §§ xSI0, x511 (Feb.
1954 Draft), providing similar treatment for stock and rights, but limiting the blanket
exclusion to distributions on common stock.
56. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 305(b).
57. Corporate distributees are taxed on the fair market value of the property received
or its adjusted basis in the hands of the distributing corporation immediately prior to the
distribution, whichever is lower. Id. § 301(b) (1) (B).
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that the taxable event for any "property received" will be its receipt, and that
its value may be fixed at the time of distribution. The regulations are consistent
with the statute: they specify that distribution amounts are includible in share-
holders' gross income when "unqualifiedly made subject to their demands.,"",
Additional language in the statute departs from the Palmer principle that
income never results from the mere issuance of stock rights. Section :305(b)
expressly classifies all taxable stock rights as "property," a description incon-
sistent with the view that prior to exercise they are mere offers to sell. The tax
treatment in section 301 is made applicable to distributions of property defined
in section 317(a) as "money, securities and any other property except stock
in the corporation making the distribution (or rights to acquire such stock) ."9
This definition dearly includes stock rights in another corporation's shares.
And section 305 (b) provides that if rights to buy the issuing corporation's stock
fall into either of the listed exceptions, they "shall be treated as a distribution
of property to which section 301 applies."00 Thus, all taxable stock rights are
expressly made property for purposes of the statute.
Further, the purpose of issuing stock rights in shares of the distributing cor-
poration in lieu of current dividend preferences suggests the propriety of taxing
the rights as dividend income to the extent of their value at issuance,°1 And
when the tax arises from an option in the shareholders to take cash or other
property in lieu of rights, there can be no doubt of the statutory intention to
tax the value of the rights upon receipt even though they may never be exer-
cised.
0 2
Not only is the statutory language inconsistent with the view that the nature
58. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(b) (1955). The quoted language arose in connection
with the constructive receipt cases where a cash basis taxpayer must report income even
prior to its actual receipt. Weil v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 821 (1949). See Comment, 45 ILL L. Rzv. 77 (1950). The Regulations also demon-
strate the possiblity of a different and possibly later date for valuation than for inclusion
in income, by prescribing that the fair market value of the property shall be determined
"as of the date of the distribution." In an example cited, the "distribution" by the cor-
poration is on the last day of December in the taxpayer's calendar year but is not received
until January 2 of the following year. The latter date would be the date for inclusion in
income.
59. I-,T. Rm,. CODE OF 1954, § 317(a) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.317-1 (1955).
60. (Emphasis added.) The regulations also expressly recognize the statutory in-
clusion of this kind of taxable stock right within the meaning of "property," by referring
to stock or rights to acquire stock of the distributing corporation "treated as property
under section 305(b)"; and they prescribe that the amount of a distribution shall be the
fair market value of "such obligations, stock, or rights." U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.301 (d)
(1955) (dealing with distributions of property to corporate distributees).
61. See page 1025 supra; Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in Kind, Redemnpions
and Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 1955 U. So. CAix. TAX INsT. 349, 357. The draft
of the American Law Institute made specific provision that the distribution of rights not
qualifying for the exclusion shall be treated as a dividend distribution, but that the exercise
shall not be so treated nior otherwise result in gain or loss. 2 ALI Fxn. INcoME TAx STAT.
§9x511(c) (1), (c) (3) (Feb. 1954 Draft).
62. See Bittker, supra note 61, at 357.
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of stock rights prevents the shareholder from receiving a taxable interest upon
the issuance, it also seems to repudiate the judicial requirement of corporate
intention to make a distribution. The statute now provides a simpler and more
objective test-has the corporation in fact made a distribution of property to
the shareholders under section 301 ? "Distribution," not expressly defined, is
used in context to describe an actual transfer of property by the corporation
to the shareholders, and, as already seen, stock rights in shares of either the
issuing or another corporation are embraced within the statutory pattern.
Under the most plausible reading of the statute the taxable event occurs
when stock rights are first made available to the shareholders. What a court
would actually decide remains a matter of conjecture, since no cases or rulings
have yet considered the taxability of stock rights under the 1954 Code.03 When
the issue arises courts should repudiate the Palmer dictum that no income is
realized upon issuance of stock rights.
Expiration of Rights Without Exercise or Sale
Under the case law prior to the 1954 Code, stock rights did not produce
income in the absence of their exercise or sale; therefore no loss was realized
upon their forfeiture by lapse.64 Neither the 1954 Code nor the regulations
speaks directly to the point on the effect of lapse. 5 Undoubtedly the rule
disallowing loss upon lapse continues to be applicable in all cases in which stock
rights are not taxed as income. But if it should be held under the 1954 Code
that the time for realization of income from a taxable distribution of stock
rights is upon receipt, the reason for continued disallowance of a loss upon
lapse would disappear. When the lapse occurs, the taxpayer would suffer a real
loss, which should be allowed at the fair market value of the rights returned
as income. 0
63. But see 1956 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 46, at 8. A proposed issue to shareholders of
package rights (to buy in a single package one share of common stock, together with one
stock purchase warrant permitting the holder to buy an additional share at set prices
within a period of years) would be non-taxable upon either issuance or the exercise
by reason of § 305(a).
64. Eastern Shares Corp., 32 B.T.A. 608 (1935); St. Louis Union Trust Co., 30
B.T.A. 370 (1934) ; G.C.M. 25063, 1947-1 Cum. BULL. 45. The rule is of course different
when a third party purchased the rights, warrants or options for a consideration, and sus-
tains a loss by expiration. 4 CCH 1957 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ff 4742.05. See Sidney Z. Mit-
chell, 18 B.T.A. 994 (1930), aff'd, 48 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1931) (10 years "option warrants"
which came attached to notes purchased by shareholder). For treatment of loss, see note
66 infra.
65. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.307-1(a) (1955), with regard to allocation of the basis
of non-taxable stock rights in the issuing corporation, states that the general rule of allocation
,hall apply with respect to stock rights only if the rights are exercised or sold. This is
consonant with disallowance of losses upon expiration without exercise or sale. The
American Law Institute draft provided specifically against allowing loss upon lapse of
non-taxed rights, but also allowed the basis of the stock to be increased by the amount
of the basis of the rights. 2 ALI FED. INcOmE TAX STAT. § x511 (a) (5) (Feb. 1954 Draft).
66. Since stock rights would normally constitute capital assets in taxpayer's hands,
see Insull v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 1937), a capital loss would result.
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Allocation of Basis Between Stock and Non-Taxable Rights
When a corporation makes a non-taxable distribution of rights to buy its
own stock under section 305 of the 1954 Code, the basis of those rights is de-
termined by allocating the adjusted basis of the underlying stock between the
stock and the rights.67 When rights are exercised, the basis allocated to the
rights is added to the subscription price to form the basis of the new stock. 8
The basis allocated to the rights, and to the newly subscribed stock, becomes
important in determining gain or loss upon a later sale of the rights or of
the new stock.
The method of allocating basis outlined in the 1954 Code is substantially
the same as in the 1939 Code,6 9 with a single exception. But the new regu-
The American Law Institute draft provided that loss caused by expiration of rights
not exempted from taxation should be allowed subject to the limitations of the worthless
securities section. ALI FED. INCOME TAX STAT. § x51 1(c) (5) (Feb. 1954 Draft). The
1954 Code, in the worthless securities provision, specifically provides that the term
"security" for purposes of the subsection includes "a right to subscribe for . . . a share
of stock in a corporation," and that the loss resulting when a security constituting a
capital asset becomes worthless shall be treated as a loss from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset on the last day of the taxable year. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(g) (2) (B).
This section clearly should apply when stock rights become worthless, and their expiration
should establish the fact of worthlessness. It seems likely that the general provision of §
1234, providing that a loss upon failure to exercise a privilege or option to buy or sell property
shall be treated as if the property had been sold or exchanged on the day the option
expires, would give way to the worthless securities provision. See MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL
TAXES § 11.3 (35th ed. 1954) ("stock options ... are not stock rights"). But see 4 CCH
1957 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ff 4742.07 ("stock rights are another form of option or privi-
lege" to which § 1234 would apply). If § 1234 applies, the taxpayer's holding would
end upon the date the rights were allowed to expire.
67. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 307 (a). The American Law Institute proposed a differ-
ent rule for allocation-the basis of rights sold without a sale of the stock would be zero,
in the absence of an election by the taxpayer to allocate; but if the rights were exercised
or the stock itself sold, allocation was made. 2 ALI FED. INcOmE TAX STAT. § x5ll(b)
(Feb. 1954 Draft).
68. See example in U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.307-1(b) (1955).
69. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 113(a) (19) (A), 53 STAT. 872; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
88 39.22(a)-8(b) (1-2), 39.113(a)(19-1) (1953); Edgar J. Hesslein, 21 B.T.A. 61
(1930), aff'd, 53 F.2d 1081 (2d Cir. 1931) (apportionment question arising upon later sale
of original stock upon which rights were received by shareholder upon reorganization) ;
Ayer v. Blair, 25 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (allocation between old stock and new
stock acquired through exercise of rights).
The exceptions to the general rule of allocation laid down by § 113(a) (19) of the
1939 Code (subdivisions (B), (C) and (D)) are designed to protect the taxpayer
and the government where past mistakes about the basis of the old stock, the new stock
or rights issued upon the old stock had been made upon sale. Thus provision was made
for the retention of the original basis of the old stock where the taxpayer without
allocating had already included the entire proceeds of sale of rights (or stock) as a
dividend, as he was once permitted to do. These specialized provisions concerning basis
under previous laws are continued in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1052(c). See 3 IEarTEus,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 21.146-21.150 (Supp. 1956) ; Alvord & Biegel, Basis Pro-
visions for Stock Dividends under the 1939 Revenue Act, 49 YALE L.J. 841 (1940). For
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lations prescribe that the allocation of the basis of the original stock shall be
between the stock and rights in proportion to the fair market values of each, as
of the date of distribution.7 ' And the date of distribution is not the record date,
but the date the rights are distributed to the shareholder, a change from prior
practice.72 Thus for purposes of allocation the time of distribution is necessarily
when the rights are actually delivered to the shareholder. A comparable usage
has already been suggested under sections 301 and 305.
7 3
Allocation is of course unnecessary when taxable distributions of stock
rights are made. The basis of the original stock then remains the same, and the
basis of the rights is their fair market value, returned as income when received.
74
Holding Periods
Consistent with the allocation of basis provisions, the holding period of the
rights, under the 1954 Code, includes the time during which the taxpayer held
the stock giving rise to the rights. 7 The same rule applies whether or not the
basis is allocated under section 307.76 A shareholder selling rights distributed
less than six months before sale thus gains a substantial advantage through
being able to tack on the period for which he has held the underlying stock.
The holding period for the new stock, on the other hand, runs only from the
date the rights were exercised.77 Neither the taxability of the rights nor the
necessity of allocating part of the old stock's basis to the new stock affects
computation of this holding period.78 Before this statutory solution case law
allocation questions relating to shares and warrants issued upon reorganization, see Wil-
liam T. Piper, 5 T.C. 1104 (1945) ; Bancitaly Corp., 34 B.T.A. 494 (1936).
In addition to allocation questions, questions of identification of the property sold
could also arise upon sale of a portion of the rights or stock acquired through their
exercise. Such questions are determinable under the usual presumption of first-in first-out.
See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §§ 39.22(a)-8(b) (3), 39.113(a) (12)-1 (1953).
70. When the value of the rights is less than 15% of the fair market value of the
stock at the time of distribution, basis need not be allocated. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
307(b). The purpose of this exception is to relieve the taxpayer from the burden of
complex calculations of basis when the value of the rights distributed is relatively
small in relation to the total investment.
71. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.307-1(a) (1955).
72. Ibid. For prior practice see I. T. 2509, VIII-2 CUM. BULL 78 (1929) ; 1. T. 2474,
VIII-1 Cur. BULL. 65 (1929) ; G.C.M. 1394, VI-1 Cums. Bum- 35 (1927).
Use of distribution rather than record date has been criticized for creating admini-
strative difficulties in taxation of stock rights. 2 CCH 1957 FED. TAX SERv., ff 2346.01.
73. See text at note 57 supra.
74. See U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.307-1(a) (1955) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22(a)-8(b)
(1953).
75. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1223(5).
76. The basis would be "determined under section 307," as that language is used in
§ 1223(5). Section 305 was recently interpreted in 1956 INT. REv. BULL. No. 46, at 8. The
corresponding 1939 Code provision was § 117(h) (5), with U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §
39.117(h)-1(b) (1953).
77. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1223(6).
78. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(h)(6), 53 STAT. 873 (now INr. RJW. CODE OF
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divided stock purchased by the exercise of rights into constituent elements
to determine holding periods: (1) the stock right element, which was governed
by the date of acquisition of the original stock; and (2) the subscription price
element, controlled by the date of exercise. 79 Under this method the same stock
might be allocated to different holding periods; not uncommonly stock could
be purchased through exercise of a series of rights issued at different times.
The present solution eliminates inconvenient calculations and administrative
complications without great inequity, since normally the greater part of the
actual basis is in the subscription price rather than the rights.80 The present
rules determining the holding periods of non-taxable stock rights and of new
stock acquired upon their exercise have been applied in a recent Treasury
ruling 81
Consistency would require that the holding period for taxable stock rights
run from the time of distribution, when their value for taxation and their
future basis is determined.
Effect Upon Earnings And Profits of Distributing Corporation
Under the 1954 Code non-taxable stock rights do not result in a distri-
bution of earnings and profits of the distributing corporation.8 2 By negative
inference a distribution of taxable stock rights should result in a reduction of
1954, § 1223(6)); U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.117(h)-lc (1953). MONTGOMERY, FEDERL
TAXES § 11.3 (35th ed. 1954).
79. Insull v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Wood v. Commissioner, 75
F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1935) ; Walter Fitch, Jr., 35 B.T.A. 537 (1937); G.C.M. 22647,
1941-1 Cum. BULL. 381; see Macy v. Helvering, 82 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1936).
80. 3 MERTExs, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.34 (Supp. 1956) ; H.R. REP. No. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1942).
81. Rev. Rul. 56-572, 1956 INT. Rav. BULL. No. 46, at 8, in which package rights
to subscribe both to additional stock and stock purchase rights were issued to shareholders
pro rata. If the shareholder sold, the holding period of the package rights dated from the
acquisition of the original stock. But if by the exercise of the package rights the share-
holder acquired new stock and stock purchase rights, the holding period of both the stock
and of the stock purchase rights so acquired was held to run from the date of exercise
under § 1223(6). In addition, the holding period of new stock acquired through the
exercise of stock purchase warrants would not begin until the date of exercise of the
warrants.
82. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 312(d). This is specifically applicable to stock rights
in shares of another corporation as well as to shares in the distributing corporation's stock.
U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.312-1(d) (1955) provides:
"In the case of a distribution of stock or rights to acquire stock a portion of
which is includible in income by reason of section 305(b), the earnings and profits
shall be reduced by the fair market value of such portion. No reduction shall be
made if a distribution of stock or rights to acquire stock is not includible in income
under the provisions of section 305."
Sections 312(d) (1) (A) and (B) specifically cover distributions by the corporation of
either its stock or securities or stock or securities in another corporation if gain to the
distributee is not recognized upon receipt under the Code. Further, for purposes of the
subsection the term "stock or securities" includes rights to acquire stock or securities.
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the earnings and profits account of the corporation. The statutory definition
of "property '8 3 does not include stock or stock rights in the issuing corporation.
And only the distribution of "property" will result in a decrease in the earnings
and profits account.8 4 Nevertheless the regulations support the interpretation
that the earnings and profits shall be reduced by the fair market value of distri-
buted rights to acquire stock includible in a shareholder's income under section
305(b). s , The same result should follow, when rights to acquire the stock
of another corporation are distributed-a result which has been reached in
the absence of specific statutory provision under the 1939 Code.86
Moreover, the choice of time of issuance to the shareholder would simplify
the bookkeeping problems of the corporation. The time for adjustment of
earnings and profits presently seems to depend upon whether the taxable event
results from the issuance or exercise of the rights. If no taxable event occurs
until a subsequent exercise or sale of the rights, the corporation would be forced
to postpone its earnings and profits adjustment, for more than a year in some
cases. The result would be especially confusing for large corporations since
their many shareholders might sell or exercise at different times. As a practical
matter, compliance with the Code requirements for earnings and profits adjust-
ments necessitates adoption of the date the rights are issued to the shareholders
as the distribution date.
Tax Consequences for The Corporation
Of course a corporation does not realize taxable gain or loss by a distribution
of stock rights to the stockholders.8 7 But the question of the taxability and time
of taxability of stock rights to the shareholders may be of importance to the
corporation since the dividends paid deduction under the accumulated earnings
tax depends upon a dividend paid.88 If the rights are -taxed as dividends to the
stockholders under section 316, deduction by the corporation will be allowed
to the extent of their fair market value.8 9
Stock Rights As Section 306 Stock
If stock rights are not taxed as income when distributed, by reason of section
:5 (a),"' they are treated, under section 306, "as stock distributed at the time
S3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 312(a), 317(a).
'4. Only the amount of the "adjusted basis" can be used in making the reduction. Id.
§ 312(a) (3).
85. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.312-1(d) (1955).
86. W. G. Maguire & Co., 20 T.C. 20 (1953).
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 311(a). See S. REI. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 247
(1954) e.:plaining that this provision, new in the 1954 Code, incorporates the general
rule of certain court decisions that the corporation realizes no gain or loss upon a
distribution of property to its shareholders. See also General Util. & Operating Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
b-. I i. REV. CODE or 1954, h8 531-537.
89. Id. § 562. And see U.S. Treas. Reg. 1.18, § 39.27(f) (1) (1953).
0. See text at note 55 supra.
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of the distribution of the stock rights."9 1 Through such treatment stock rights,
as well as stock acquired through their exercise, may later be subject to ordinary
income taxation upon redemption or disposition, but only to 'the extent of the
fair market value of the rights at the time of the distribution.92 The regulations
agree that the amount to be given ordinary income tax treatment upon sub-
sequent disposition of the rights, or of stock acquired by the exercise of the
rights, is determined by reference to the date of distribution of the rights.
93
Stock Rights as "Stock Or Securities" Under Reorganization Provisions
For purposes of the statutory dispensations providing for non-recognition
of gain or loss in connection with the receipt of stock or securities upon a
transfer to a controlled corporation 94 and upon certain exchanges of stock or
securities in corporate reorganizations of both the combinative 95 and divisive t'
types, the applicable Regulations all prescribe that "stock rights or stock war-
rants are not included in the term 'stock or securities.' ",97 Therefore, stock
rights or stock warrants received would constitute "other property" treated as
boot under section 356,98 and the fair market value of the gain would be taxed
as a dividend to the extent of the shareholder's ratable share of the undistributed
earnings and profits of the corporation. 99
CONCLUSION
Courts should accept the opportunity given them by the 1954 Code to hold
receipt of taxable stock rights the taxable event. In so doing, they can elimi-
nate the difficulties caused by illogical principles developed in past decisions.
Treating stock rights as a distribution in the amount of their fair market value
at the time of issuance would follow the established pattern for taxation of
other valuable property. And the consistent practice in valuation of the tax-
able amount at the one date of issuance would greatly simplify the corpora-
tion's task in keeping current its earnings and profits accounts.
91. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 306(c) (1) (A), 306(d) (2). Cf. 2 ALl FED. INCOME
TAX STAT. §§ x511(a) (3) (B), x511(a) (4) (Feb. 1954 Draft).
92. U. S. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(b) (1955). The rights will not be § 306 stock if no
part of the distribution would have been a dividend if money had been distributed in lieu
of the rights. This situation would occur when the corporate earnings and profits
account is insufficient to cover the distribution.
93. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(b) (1955).
94. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 351.
95. Id. §§ 354, 368.
96. Id. § 355.
97. U.S. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.351-1(a) (1), 1.354-1(e), 1.355-1 (a) (1955).
98. See INT. Rwv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 351(b), 354(a) (3), 355(a) (4), 356. Previous
cases in accord: James F. Curtis, 3 T.C. 648, 659 (1944) ; Margaret Weston, P-H 1941
B.T.A. Mem. Dec. ff 41046, appeal dismissed pursuant to stipulation, 135 F.2d 738 (Sth
Cir. 1943). But cf. William T. Piper, 5 T.C. 1104 (1945); E. P. Raymond, 37 B.T.A.
423 (1938) ; Bancitaly Corp., 34 B.T.A. 494 (1936).
99. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 356(a) (1) (B), 354. Section 356(b) provides that,
if § 355 would apply but for the fact that the distribution consists also of other property,
the other property "shall be treated as a distribution to which section 301 applies."
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